Mujahedeen (also mujahedin, mujahidin), Arabic, literal translation is "holy warriors."
The most well-known, and feared, mujahedeen were the opposition groups that fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 and the following civil war.
Afghanistan's resistance movement was born in chaos, spread and
triumphed chaotically, and has not found a way to govern
differently. Virtually all of its war was waged locally. As warfare
became more sophisticated, outside support and regional coordination
grew. Even so, the basic units of mujahedin organization and action
continued to reflect the highly segmented nature of Afghan society.
In the course of the guerilla war, leadership came to be
distinctively associated with the title, "commander." It applied
to independent leaders, eschewing identification with elaborate
military bureaucracy associated with such ranks as general. As
the war produced leaders of reputation, "commander" was conferred
on leaders of fighting units of all sizes, signifying pride in
independence, self-sufficiency, and distinct ties to local
community. The title epitomized Afghan pride in their struggle
against an overwhelmingly powerful foe. Segmentation of power and
religious leadership were the two values evoked by nomenclature
generated in the war. Neither had been favored in ideology of the
former Afghan state.
Olivier Roy estimates that after four years of war there were
at least 4,000 bases from which mujahedin units operated. Most of
these were affiliated with the seven expatriate parties
headquartered in Pakistan which served as sources of supply and
varying degrees of supervision. Significant commanders typically
led 300 or more men, controlled several bases and dominated a
district or a sub-division of a province. Hierarchies of
organization above the bases were attempted. Their operations
varied greatly in scope, the most ambitious being achieved by
Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Panjshir valley[?] north of Kabul. He led
at least 10,000 trained troops at the end of the Soviet war and
had expanded his political control of Tajik dominated areas to
Afghanistan's northeastern provinces under the Supervisory
Council of the North.
Roy also describes regional, ethnic and sectarian variations
in mujahedin organization. In the Pushtun areas of the east,
south and southwest, tribal structure, with its many rival
sub-divisions, provided the basis for military organization and
leadership. Mobilization could be readily linked to traditional
fighting allegiances of the tribal lashkar (fighting
force). In favorable circumstances such formations could quickly
reach more than 10,000, as happened when large Soviet assaults
were launched in the eastern provinces, or when the mujahedin
besieged towns, such as Khost[?] in Paktia[?] province. But in
campaigns of the latter type the traditional explosions of
manpower--customarily common immediately after the completion of
harvest--proved obsolete when confronted by well dug-in defenders
with modern weapons. Lashkar durability was notoriously short;
few sieges succeeded.
Mujahedin mobilization in non-Pushtun[?] regions faced very
different obstacles. Prior to the invasion few non-Pushtuns
possessed firearms. Early in the war they were most readily
available from army troops or gendarmerie who defected or were
ambushed. The international arms market and foreign military
support tended to reach the minority areas last.
In the northern regions little military tradition had survived
upon which to build an armed resistance. Mobilization mostly came
from political leadership closely tied to Islam.
Roy convincingly contrasts the social leadership of religious
figures in the Persian and Turkish speaking regions of
Afghanistan with that of the Pushtuns. Lacking a strong political
representation in a state dominated by Pushtuns, minority
communities commonly looked to pious learned or charismatically
revered pirs (saints) for leadership. Extensive Sufi and
maraboutic[?] networks were spread through the minority communities,
readily available as foundations for leadership, organization,
communication and indoctrination. These networks also provided
for political mobilization, which led to some of the most
effective of the resistance operations during the war.
Many Muslims from other countries volunteered to assist various Mujahedeen groups in Afghanistan, and gained significant experience in guerrilla warfare. Some groups of these veterans have been significant factors in more recent conflicts in and around the Muslim world.
The Mujahedeen "won" when the Soviet Union pulled troops out of Afganistan in 1989, followed by the fall of the Mohammad_Najibullah regime in 1992. However, the Mujahedeen did not establish a united government, and they were in turn ousted from power by the Taliban in 1996.
